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BANKRUPTCY FOR THE POOR? 
For two reasons, the conventional wisdom is that the poor are 
not heavy users of the insolvency system. First, creditors are 
reluctant to extend credit to the poor because the risks of non-
payment are high. Not having been able to borrow, the poor are 
not over-indebted and are therefore not in need of bankruptcy 
protection. Second, some poor debtors—lone parents on social 
assistance for example—are "judgment-proof" meaning that 
judgments for money recoveries obtained by their creditors are 
of no effect because these debtors do not have sufficient non-
exempt property or income to satisfy the judgment. 
Developments in two areas may challenge the conventional 
view. Undoubtedly, credit is now widely available across the 
spectrum of income groups. Even a short-term, low-wage job can 
bring a credit card to the doorstep of the poor and the slogan "no 
credit, no problem" testifies to the availability of retail credit. In 
addition, we now know that poverty is often a temporary state 
for many Canadians, with many moving in and out of low-
income. Accordingly, the "judgment-proof" state is not a 
permanent condition, but a temporary status for many. While 
this may be welcome news in some respects, it means that debts 
can be accumulated during periods of relative economic well-
being only to go unpaid when a job ends or when hard times 
return. These developments suggest the possibility that some of 
those who are poor at any point in time are in fact in need of 
bankruptcy protection. They have debts that they are unable to 
pay and little likelihood of being able to repay in the near future. 
We begin the paper by presenting evidence from the 1999 Survey 




lower income deciles. We then turn to the main question: 
should the Canadian bankruptcy process be more readily 
available to poor debtors. We draw on two sources to shed light 
on this question: a) a comparative analysis (considering England 
and Wales, the United States, Australia and New Zealand) and b) 
a series of semi-structured interviews with Canadian bankruptcy 
trustees and other insolvency professionals. 
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BANKRUPTCY FOR THE POOR? 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai∗ and Saul Schwartz** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Should the bankruptcy process be more readily available to poor 
Canadians? Several different jurisdictions have recognized that 
it can be difficult for poor debtors to file for bankruptcy due to 
the associated out-of-pocket costs and have identified forms of 
relief that can assist them in obtaining a fresh start. This paper 
addresses the question of whether Canadian debtors who cannot 
afford to pay the normal fees charged by bankruptcy trustees 
should have low-cost access to bankruptcy through a 
mechanism other than the summary administration procedure. 
We draw on two sources to shed light on this question: (1) a 
comparative analysis of different approaches adopted in the 
United States, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands; and (2) our findings from a series of semi-
structured interviews with bankruptcy trustees. Bankruptcy 
trustees in Canada are the private intermediaries (often 
accountants) who are regulated and licensed by the Office of the 
Superintendent in Bankruptcy (OSB) and serve as gatekeepers to 
the consumer bankruptcy process. 
The research question under consideration goes to the heart of 
the long-standing debate about the ease with which debtors 
                                            
∗ Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This research project is 
funded by the Industry Canada Insolvency Research Initiative Program 
2006/7. Val Culp provided excellent research assistance. We would like to 
thank Catherine Dupont, Stephanie Cavanagh, Dave Stewart and Steve 
Joanisse of the Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy for their 
assistance. We would especially like to thank the bankruptcy trustees, 
members of the insolvency community and the former bankrupt we 
interviewed. All errors remain our own.  
** Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University. 
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should be able to obtain a full discharge of their debts through 
the bankruptcy process. On one side of the debate are those who 
believe that the vast majority of debtors filing bankruptcy are 
honest but unfortunate and seek relief from their debts only as a 
distasteful last resort. Those on the other side of the debate 
believe that many who file for bankruptcy could repay their 
debts if only they were more diligent in their work habits and 
more careful in their spending habits. These two views lead to 
different conclusions about any initiative that makes 
bankruptcy more accessible. Those adhering to the first view 
believe that greater accessibility will not dramatically increase 
the numbers of debtors who file for bankruptcy since 
bankruptcy is sought only as a last resort. Those who hold to the 
second view believe that the barriers to bankruptcy, both 
monetary and non-monetary, must be kept high in order to 
discourage large numbers of debtors from seeking bankruptcy. 
As demonstrated through our interviews with a number of 
bankruptcy trustees, this general debate spills over into the 
narrower debate about the subset of debtors who have so little 
income that they cannot pay a trustee’s normal fees, even if 
those fees can be paid over the nine months of a typical 
summary administration.  
A key issue for this paper is defining what we mean by “poor 
debtors.” All debtors filing for bankruptcy attest to the fact that 
they are insolvent, unable to make debt payments as they come 
due. In that sense, all bankrupts are poor. However, most of 
those filing for bankruptcy have sufficient income to make 
relatively small monthly payments to the trustee, drawing 
either upon their earnings or upon friends and family. We are 
interested here in the much smaller group of debtors whom the 
trustee has deemed as lacking the funds to pay the normal fees. 
In such cases, the trustee must decide whether to accept lower-
than-normal fees or to turn the debtor away.  
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We asked each of the trustees that we interviewed to 
characterize such debtors and found that they shared a common 
vision. As one trustee put it: “These are people who live a 
marginal existence, on social assistance, living in government-
subsidized housing and with no prospects for changing this 
around.”1 That same trustee stated that such debtors have “no 
income, no friends, no family” and are “by themselves and at 
the end of their rope.” Others spoke of debtors with physical or 
cognitive disabilities2 or of lone mothers who are immigrants 
with limited ability to speak English or French.3 Women seem to 
figure prominently among poor debtors, most likely reflecting 
the feminization of poverty that has occurred in recent decades. 
In our view, the key element of this characterization is the 
strong likelihood that these debtors will experience persistent 
poverty, with or without their debts. They are not using the 
bankruptcy system to discharge their debts with the goal of 
moving on to a comfortable middle-class existence. We concur 
with the views of the trustees and henceforth will use the term 
“poor debtors” to refer to debtors seeking bankruptcy who 
cannot pay the trustee’s normal fees and who seem unlikely to 
attain anything but a low income for the foreseeable future. 
The existence of poor debtors has long been known. The 
unresolved question is whether there are large numbers of 
debtors who are unable to go through the bankruptcy process 
because they are unable to pay the trustee’s fees. The trustees 
with whom we spoke were unanimous in their opinion that the 
number of poor debtors who were unable to file for bankruptcy 
was quite small.4 The reason, in their view, is that they were 
themselves willing to handle the file of any debtor who appeared 
                                            
1 Interview with Trustee 4, 15 September 2006. 
2 Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006. 
3 Interview with Trustee 1, 18 August 2006. 
4 Trustees 2, 3, 5, and 6. 
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before them and that they felt that debtors in other places would 
be able to find a trustee to take their case. 
The trustees we interviewed recognized that poor debtors are 
usually judgement proof and face no real prospect that a court 
would allow their creditors to take any action against them. 
Each trustee said that they informed debtors of what it meant to 
be judgement proof, explaining that the debtors could stop 
collection efforts by telling the collection agencies of their 
inability to pay. However, the trustees did not equate 
“judgement proof” with “not in need of bankruptcy.”  
As one trustee put it, “creditors are very aggressive and they [the 
debtors] reach a breaking point. I always tell them they are 
judgement proof but this doesn’t help them in dealing with 
creditors on a day-to-day basis.”5 Another trustee stated that 
even though he always informs poor debtors that they are 
judgement proof, debtors often have an emotional need to be 
debt-free; he gave an example of handling the bankruptcy of 
someone on their deathbed, a debtor who wanted to die debt-
free.6 The trustees interviewed expressed a surprising lack of 
concern with administering bankruptcies for debtors who were 
clearly judgement proof. Even if these debtors are judgement 
proof, the trustees believe they require protection from overly-
enthusiastic collection efforts; debtors “believe creditors when 
they say they are going to do something” and “just not 
answering the phone can be difficult and they may not have the 
money to change the telephone number.”7 Some expressed 
sympathy towards debtors who not only face harassing 
                                            
5 Interview with Trustee 8, 8 September 2006. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. That same trustee noted that 
many people now have only a cell phone and pay for minutes even when 
someone calls them. Calls from collection agencies can therefore be 
expensive for the debtor. 
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collection efforts, but also hear misrepresentations of what 
might happen if they fail to make payments.  
The debtors that these trustees have in mind should be 
distinguished from so-called no-income, no-asset (NINA) 
debtors.8 In the Canadian context, NINA debtors have no non-
exempt assets to liquidate and no income above the OSB’s 
Surplus Income Guidelines. In such cases, there is only a small 
prospect of a significant dividend for creditors. Estimates suggest 
that 70 to 80 per cent of bankruptcies in Canada are filed by 
NINA debtors. Most of these debtors, however, are able to pay 
the normal trustee fees, spread out over the nine months of the 
summary administration. They are poor, but the depth of their 
poverty is far less than that of the debtors described above. 
As background, a short summary of the operation of the OSB’s 
Surplus Income Guidelines is in order. Debtors who have 
income above the OSB’s Surplus Income thresholds must make 
contributions to the estate during the bankruptcy period. For 
example, a bankrupt in a family unit of 2 with $2800 of 
available monthly income would be required to pay $181 per 
month in Surplus Income Payments until they are discharged 
from bankruptcy. The Surplus Income thresholds are based on 
the Low Income Cut-Offs (LICO) published by Statistics Canada. 
Any analysis of Surplus Income payments requires an analysis of 
the Statement of Receipts and Disbursements (SRD) which 
shows the receipts coming into each estate and the payments 
(including trustee fees and creditor dividends). From January 1, 
2006 to December 31, 2006, the SRD was electronically-
                                            
8 In the deliberations of the OSB’s Personal Insolvency Task Force some five 
years ago, there was substantial discussion of the idea of creating a new and 
simpler insolvency procedure for NINA debtors. In the end, it was decided 
that a streamlined version of the existing summary administration procedure 
would adequately address the issue.  
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submitted for 29,379 summary administration bankruptcies (see 
Appendix C for a description of these data). In roughly 20 
percent of these files (5,739/29279), the debtor was required to 
make payments from their Surplus Income under Section 168 of 
the BIA; in the other 80 percent, no requirement to make 
Surplus Income payments was imposed. Of the 5,739 cases 
required to make Surplus Income payments, 63 percent 
(3,635/5,739) paid a creditor dividend and 37 percent did not. For 
the 3,635 cases that paid a dividend, the average dividend paid 
was $1,982 (with a standard deviation of $3,964). For the 23,640 
estates without a Surplus Income requirement, 28 percent paid a 
dividend and 72 percent did not; the mean dividend among those 
who paid a dividend was $1,106 with a standard deviation of 
$2,261.9 
To summarize, the trustees interviewed held a common 
conception of the characteristics of the debtor who could not 
afford to pay trustees’ fees. Even though the typical such debtor 
is judgement proof, the trustees still felt that they deserved the 
right to file for bankruptcy. Moreover, we should be careful not 
to confuse the relatively small number of poor debtors currently 
seeking bankruptcy with the very large number of debtors who 
have no non-exempt assets and no income above the OSB’s 
Surplus Income Guidelines.  
                                            
9 Calculations by the Business Intelligence Centre of the Office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy. See also Appendix C. 
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II. DO THE POOR NEED BANKRUPTCY? 
The poor in the context of consumer bankruptcy are not only 
insolvent at the time of filing for bankruptcy, but are likely to 
have been poor for some time and are likely to remain in 
poverty for the foreseeable future. Their current earnings 
prospects are dim and their life circumstances are such that any 
upward economic mobility will be impeded by significant 
barriers. 
However, for one of two reasons, some might question whether 
the poor need bankruptcy. The first reason has already been 
discussed. Many of the poor are judgement proof and, in 
principle, can simply refuse to respond to collection efforts. 
Nonetheless, that seemingly simple refusal is far more difficult 
than one might think and judgement proof debtors frequently 
appear in trustees’ offices seeking bankruptcy protection.  
The second reason for believing that the poor do not need 
bankruptcy is the idea that the poor do not accumulate very 
large debts and therefore have little need for bankruptcy 
protection. In this section, we use the 1999 Survey of Financial 
Security to illustrate that the so-called “democratization of 
credit”—the extension of credit throughout the income 
distribution—has proceeded to the point where even families in 
the lowest deciles of family income have significant debts.  
Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of various kinds of debt 
across the deciles of family income. Families in the bottom 
three deciles almost certainly have incomes that are less than 
the relevant Statistics Canada Low Income Cut-Off (LICO) and 
therefore might qualify as poor by our definition.10  
                                            
10 There is, however, an important difference between the poor families in 
Tables 1 and 2 and poor families as we think of them in the context of 
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Table 1 makes clear that significant proportions of the poor have 
debts in each of the categories listed. To be sure, families in the 
lowest three deciles are less likely to have various types of debts 
than those in the higher deciles, but one in four has credit card 
debt and one in six hold other debts. Since bankruptcy is a 
situation facing only a minority of debtors, these proportions are 
large enough to suggest that a significant minority of poor 
families will have significant debts coming due at a time when 
their income is low. The amounts shown in Table 2 are averages 
only for those who have positive amounts of debt in each 
category, but their size once again suggests that poor families 
may acquire significant debts, especially in relation to their low 
income.  
We note in passing that student loan debts are an important type 
of debt held by the poor, both in terms of frequency and size, 
and student loans are not dischargeable through bankruptcy. We 
see that the families in the lowest decile are the most likely to 
hold student loans, partly because those loans are directed to 
students from low-income families and partly because there is a 
correlation between the incomes of parents and children. If the 
debts of a poor family become overwhelming, it may make sense 
to file for bankruptcy in order to discharge the debts that are 
dischargeable and to then focus on repaying the student loans 
that are not dischargeable.  
                                                                                                            
bankruptcy. In our conception, poor families seeking bankruptcy protection 
are not only poor at a single point in time but are likely to remain poor for 
the foreseeable future. Because there is considerable mobility in and out of 
poverty in Canada, a significant minority of families in the lowest deciles of 
family income in Tables 1 and 2 are likely to move out of poverty in future 
years.  
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Table 1: Proportion of Families with Various Types of Debt 












Less than $12,250 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.50 
12,250-18,000 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.47 
18,000-24,700 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.10 0.20 0.57 
24,700-31,850 0.22 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.24 0.65 
31,850-40,000 0.32 0.24 0.42 0.12 0.27 0.72 
40,000-49,000 0.41 0.28 0.46 0.10 0.32 0.78 
49,000-60,850 0.45 0.31 0.47 0.11 0.35 0.81 
60,850-76,800 0.53 0.34 0.48 0.12 0.40 0.84 
76,800-105,300 0.52 0.34 0.45 0.10 0.39 0.83 
More than 105,300 0.47 0.23 0.30 0.05 0.39 0.76 
Source: 1999 Survey of Financial Security (unweighted). See Schwartz, S. and S. Baum, "How 
Much Debt is Too Much? Benchmarks for Manageable Debt in Canada and the United States" in 
Bruce Doern and Christopher Stoney, eds. Universities and the Powering of Knowledge: Policy, 
Regulation and Innovation (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2007), Chapter 7. Note: All 
debts are reported for the family as a whole. 
Table 2: Amount of Debt Outstanding for Families with Non-negative Debt 











Less than $12,250 $62,260 $6,968 $2,064 $11,961 $6,562 $19,430 
12,250-18,000 52,348 8,338 1,957 12,013 8,601 19,875 
18,000-24,700 51,815 8,113 2,233 9,983 6,307 23,651 
24,700-31,850 51,783 9,393 2,551 11,593 8,171 29,248 
31,850-40,000 58,804 9,835 2,696 10,611 9,021 39,202 
40,000-49,000 65,158 10,897 2,998 10,093 9,126 48,871 
49,000-60,850 70,281 11,005 3,186 9,619 11,740 58,561 
60,850-76,800 75,093 12,054 3,479 9,979 14,589 69,382 
76,800-105,300 80.899 14,469 3,786 9,769 17,632  77,080 
More than 105,300 117,558 16,108 4,721 12,354 33,266 109,512 
No. of Families 5,098 3,506 5,993 1,615 4,592 10,543 
Source: 1999 Survey of Financial Security (unweighted). See Schwartz, S. and S. Baum, "How Much 
Debt is Too Much? Benchmarks for Manageable Debt in Canada and the United States" in Bruce 
Doern and Christopher Stoney, eds. Universities and the Powering of Knowledge: Policy, Regulation 
and Innovation (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2007), Chapter 7. Note: All debts are 
reported for the family as a whole. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM 
One option facing poor but heavily indebted Canadians is to do 
nothing. Whatever threats might be made by collectors and 
regardless of the persistence of their calls and visits, such 
individuals are likely to be judgement proof and the threats and 
calls will eventually stop. “Doing nothing”, however, when 
faced with persistent and threatening collection calls is easier 
said than done. Few know the law well enough to know that the 
threats are empty and that the calls will stop sooner rather than 
later. For those who seek to resolve their debt situations, 
bankruptcy can be the best option. The other major option—
credit counselling as currently practiced in Canada—is unlikely 
to be successful because poor debtors often lack the financial 
resources to make the payments required by a debt management 
plan.  
The premise of this paper is that there may be debtors in need of 
bankruptcy who cannot afford the fees that trustees ask. As 
background, a short summary of the rules that govern the fee-
setting behaviour of trustees is in order. Rule 128(1) of the BIA 
sets out the method in which maximum fees are to be 
calculated.11 Essentially, these maximum fees are a function of 
the amount of receipts coming into the estate. The fee schedule 
sets out the maximum fees that a trustee can collect (the first 
$975, plus 35 percent of the next $1,025, plus 50 percent of 
everything above $2,000 to a maximum of $10,000). In practice, 
it seems that trustees try to realize at least $1,500 to $1,700 on 
each file. Of course, they are free to take less if they so choose.  
At the onset of a bankruptcy, the level of receipts is generally 
unknown since it will depend on the amount the trustee earns 
for the estate by selling the debtor’s assets and on the refunds, if 
                                            
11 See Appendix B.  
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any, from the trustee’s filing of the debtor’s tax returns. In 
deciding whether or not to accept the case, trustees must decide 
if they are likely to be paid for their efforts. In many cases, 
debtors have no non-exempt assets and the amounts that can be 
expected from the debtors’ tax returns are not enough to bring 
the receipts of the estate up to an acceptable level. In such cases, 
trustees are allowed to ask the debtors to make payments to the 
estate, over the course of the nine months of the bankruptcy. In 
a significant minority of bankruptcies, these voluntary 
payments comprise the bulk of the receipts of the estate.12  
The problem for the poor debtors is that trustees may decide, 
rightly or wrongly, that the receipts of the estate, including any 
voluntary payments that the debtor can afford, are not likely to 
reach an acceptable level. If so, the trustee need not accept the 
case. 
In talking to the trustees, we realized that a poor debtor who 
decides to seek bankruptcy in Canada and cannot afford to make 
the voluntary payments required by most trustees has two 
options. First, the debtors may try to find a trustee who will 
                                            
12 For summary administration bankruptcies with SRDs electronically-
submitted between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006, the proportion of 
receipts consisting of voluntary payments by the debtor can be estimated (see 
Appendix C). Voluntary payments were made in 77 percent of the cases. 
Voluntary payments made up more than 50 percent of the receipts in 49 
percent of the cases and were more than 75 percent of the receipts of the 
estate in 25 percent. A controversial issue here is that the voluntary 
payments that trustees are allowed to ask of debtors become part of the estate 
and cannot be returned to the debtor should actual receipts turn out to be 
unexpectedly large. If trustees expect that receipts from the sale of non-
exempt assets or from tax refunds will cover trustees’ usual fees, they will 
presumably lower or eliminate the voluntary payments. The only mechanism 
driving trustees to lower their fees in such cases, however, is potential 
competition from other trustees.  
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handle the file at a lower-than-normal price. Second, the debtors 
might seek help from the Bankruptcy Assistance Program (BAP) 
operated by the OSB. 
A. RELYING ON AREA TRUSTEES 
Conceivably, debtors who seek help from trustees in their area 
might be turned away by all of them. None of the trustees that 
we interviewed, however, believed that large numbers of poor 
debtors were in fact being turned away due to their inability to 
pay trustees’ fees. Even if some area firms were unwilling to 
accept the files, the trustees thought that poor debtors would be 
able to find at least one trustee who would be flexible in the fees 
that he or she asked. The majority of the trustees we 
interviewed indicated that they themselves would never turn 
away a debtor seeking bankruptcy if they thought that the only 
obstacle to bankruptcy was the level of their fees. Most would 
agree with one trustee’s statement that she “would never refuse 
someone who cannot afford the fee.”13 However, the decision to 
be flexible on fees is not automatic; the trustees described the 
decision as one made on a case-by-case, dependent upon the 
information gleaned during their initial interviews with the 
debtor. 
The trustees were willing to go beyond their own personal 
experience to suggest that such flexibility is quite common 
among trustees. While this flexibility may be common, it may 
not be universal. One trustee said that the national firms in her 
location did not lower their fees if the debtor could not pay.14 
Another trustee (from a national firm) said that firms that were 
busy were unlikely to be flexible in their fees.15  
                                            
13 Interview with Trustee 1, 18 August 2006.  
14 Interview with Trustee 2, 8 September 2006. 
15 Interview with Trustee 9, 29 November 2006. 
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In some cities, area trustees have gotten together and decided to 
handle the cases of poor debtors according to an agreed-upon 
formula. Such voluntary plans are not new. In 1969, the Globe 
and Mail reported that “a newly formed group of Ontario 
bankruptcy trustees has agreed to negotiate a plan for reduced-
cost service to debtors who cannot afford the usual $500 fee for 
personal bankrupts.”16 The plan was aimed at “the honest debtor 
who deserves the benefit of the bankruptcy but can’t finance it 
himself.”17 
In 1994, trustees in the Halifax region agreed that, as a group, 
they would handle the bankruptcies of anyone who needed the 
service and could not afford it.18 That agreement has persisted 
over time and today poor debtors are asked to pay only $250.19 
Similarly, trustees in Edmonton agreed in 1999 to a similar 
arrangement for dealing with what are now known as “450 
cases” because the out-of-pocket costs (and therefore the fee 
charged) at that time amounted to $450.20 
Apart from the reports of trustees, however, there is no way to 
determine precisely how many debtors are simply turned away, 
who do not approach trustees because they think they will be 
                                            
16 Loren Lind, “New service offered to lower costs of bankruptcy” Globe and 
Mail (6 February 1969) 35. It is important to note that in that era the 
summary tariff was a flat $450 fee plus $50 for disbursements. This was the 
maximum fee possible for such files regardless of the amount of work 
performed. At that time the vast majority of trustees required that the $500 
had to be paid up front before the bankruptcy would be filed. Email from 
Dave Stewart, Deputy Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 24 October 2006. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Interview with Trustee 6, 20 September 2006. 
19 The fee is still $250 in Halifax even though out-of-pocket costs are now 
higher. Ibid. 
20 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. 
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unable to afford the normal fees or who cannot afford upfront 
payments of $250-$450.21  
B. THE BANKRUPTCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
The OSB administers a little-used program called the 
Bankruptcy Assistance Program (BAP).22 Trustees must agree to 
be part of the program and those who do so are placed on a list of 
available trustees. The program then assigns listed trustees to 
administer the files of debtors who have approached at least two 
trustees to handle their bankruptcies but who have been turned 
away because of their inability to pay the normal fees. 
Very few cases are actually filed under the BAP program. Of the 
29,379 summary administration cases with electronically-
submitted SRDs received between January 1 and December 31 
2006, only 304 were BAP cases.23 Our interviews illustrate, 
however, that it would be a mistake to assume that the number 
of poor debtors is equal to the number of BAP cases. For 
example, in the cities where an agreement exists among trustees 
to handle poor debtors in a certain way, trustees will often not 
refer poor debtors to the BAP program, but will simply 
administer the cases themselves. Perhaps a better measure of the 
number of poor debtors is the number of cases in which receipts 
are less than $500; of the above-mentioned 29,075 non-BAP 
                                            
21 We note that this is a common situation in evaluating program 
participation; since information on non-participants is rarely collected, there 
is no effective way to estimate their number apart from anecdotal evidence 
from practitioners. 
22 The statutory source for the BAP is a directive known as "Directive No.11" 
made pursuant to the BIA. Section 5(4)(b) to (e) of the BIA provides the OSB 
with the power to make directives. Directive No. 11 was first issued on 
October 23, 1986. See: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inbsf-
osb.nsf/en/br01331e.html for the actual directive. 
23 Calculations by the Business Intelligence Centre of the Office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy. See also Appendix C. 
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summary administration bankruptcies, receipts were less than 
$500 in 1,056 of the files.24 
There is no set fee charged by trustees for BAP cases. As in all 
summary administration cases, the trustee collects GST refunds 
and any tax refund arising from the pre-bankruptcy tax return. 
For poor debtors, these sources might yield only a small amount 
of money. In such cases, most of the trustees that we 
interviewed ask that the debtor pay for the $75 filing fee and the 
$180 cost of the two counselling sessions up front, allowing the 
debtor to pay off any remaining voluntary payments that may be 
required by the trustee with small payments over the nine 
months of the bankruptcy.  
One trustee told us, however, that BAP cases in her area were 
often almost as remunerative as non-BAP cases, with the trustee 
realizing fees close to the usual amount charged.25 The 
Edmonton trustee that we interviewed stated that the GST 
refunds usually cover the out-of-pocket costs and that she had 
only lost money on two of the “450 cases” that she has handled 
since 1999.26 Another trustee informed us that he averages 
$1,000 to $1,200 on a BAP case as opposed to the $1,200 to 
$1,500 that he charges for a typical summary administration.27 
Looking at the receipts and disbursements for the 304 BAP cases 
with SRDs electronically-submitted in calendar 2006, we see 
that the average trustee fee in these cases was $1,500 with a 
standard deviation of $986. This mean seemed surprisingly high 
and we thought it might be influenced by a handful of cases in 
which the receipts of the estate (and thus the trustee’s fee) were 
                                            
24 The number of cases with receipts less than $500 is not necessarily the 
number of cases filed by poor debtors. As we will see later in the paper, many 
BAP cases have receipts greater than $500.  
25 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006. 
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inflated by unusual circumstances. For example, one BAP debtor 
received a $39,000 inheritance during his bankruptcy. However, 
the median trustee fee is $1,594 suggesting that the few cases 
with large receipts were not the main factor underlying the high 
mean. Voluntary payments from the debtors were not common; 
such payments were made in only 61 of the 304 cases.  
Even though the average fees on BAP cases seem high to us, one 
trustee felt that there was no unmet need for bankruptcy in his 
area. He thought that all those who sought help in his area were 
being served and, furthermore, extensive advertising by trustees 
meant that no needy debtors were unaware of the option of 
filing.28 Another trustee observed that because the ability of 
trustees to oppose the bankrupt’s discharge for unpaid fees 
provided security that their fees would be paid few debtors were 
turned way. The same trustee, however, also observed that the 
costs of attending at court for the discharge hearing might be 
excessive for a trustee operating on his or her own.29 
C. DISCUSSION 
We believe that the lack of uniform treatment of poor debtors is 
a major impediment to equal access to bankruptcy. In effect, 
their bankruptcies are handled in a way similar to how paupers 
received aid before the advent of modern social assistance 
systems, when local charities, local churches, or municipal 
governments took up the task of providing for the destitute. As a 
result, the nature of the assistance that the poor received varied 
widely across Canada. Some received the assistance that they 
required, while others did not. Similarly, some poor debtors 
have low-cost access to bankruptcy; others do not.  
                                            
28 Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006. 
29 Interview with Trustee 9, 29 November 2006. 
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A broad assessment of the situation suggests that most of those who 
seek bankruptcy are able to file. The cost of filing varies across the 
country, however, so the extent to which low-cost access is 
available is unknown. 
Debtors who cannot afford to pay trustee fees can use the BAP 
program, but few do. Instead, some individual trustees and groups of 
trustees take it upon themselves to provide service to poor debtors. 
The Halifax and Edmonton agreements discussed above are 
examples of collective action of the sort that local charities might 
have undertaken to help the poor in the nineteenth century.  
While the analogy to 19th century social assistance is apt in some 
ways, it is less appropriate in others. For trustees specializing in 
consumer bankruptcies, fee flexibility is sometimes a good business 
decision rather than pro bono work. Most small businesses need to 
maintain a steady volume of cases in order to keep the staff busy. 
During periods when full-price cases are scarce, servicing poor 
debtors “keeps the lights on” even if the profit on such cases may 
turn out to be low or non-existent.30 The idea is that “anything is a 
contribution to overhead.”31 The marginal cost of such cases is very 
small since the staff is already on site and may be underemployed 
during slow periods. The files of poor debtors may therefore have a 
positive effect on the economic viability of trustees’ businesses, 
helping them cover overhead during slow periods. Two of the 
interviewed trustees even thought that removing the files of poor 
debtors might endanger the economic viability of trustees who 
specialize in consumer bankruptcy.32 The trustee from the large firm 
also noted this phenomenon when he said that he did not have to 
worry about cash flow and therefore did not need to take on the files 
of poor debtors for that reason. 
                                            
30 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. 
31 Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006. 
32 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006; Interview with Trustee 6, 20 
September 2006. 
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IV. SHOULD POOR DEBTORS HAVE FINANCIALLY 
ACCESSIBLE OPTIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY?  
A. THE AMERICAN IN FORMA PAUPERIS EXPERIENCE 
The American academic literature has tackled the issue of 
whether poor debtors should be allowed to file in forma pauperis 
petitions in bankruptcy. In the United States, the authority to 
proceed in forma pauperis is granted by statute, and is meant to 
provide indigent litigants with meaningful access to the federal 
courts, equivalent to the access available to those who can 
afford to pay.33 When an individual successfully petitions to 
proceed in forma pauperis, certain costs and fees are waived.34 
Those who argue against allowing in forma pauperis proceedings 
in bankruptcy stress the cost implications of waiving fees: the 
amount of fees collected by the system would decrease.35 
Furthermore, critics assert, nearly everyone who files for 
bankruptcy relief will ask that fees be waived, and therefore 
screening mechanisms will have to be introduced adding time 
and expense.36 Opponents suggest that a fee waiver system 
would encourage unnecessary and improper bankruptcy cases:37 
individuals would file for bankruptcy even when there is no 
benefit in doing so—because debtors who cannot afford the 
filing fee are typically judgement proof.38 Such a system may 
                                            
33 Michael E. Markham & Bethann Scharrer, “In Forma Pauperis: An 
Unnecessary Privilege in Bankruptcy” (1994) 73 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 73 
at 77. 
34 Ibid. at 78. In the United States, some costs and fees are not waived. For 
example, witness fees and expenses are not among the fees and costs waived. 
35 Ibid. at 90. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., Implementing and Evaluating the Chapter 7 
Filing Fee Waiver Program (Federal Judicial Center, 1998), online: 
<http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/autoframepage!openform&url=/li
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also be subject to abuse or fraud: critics argue, for example, that 
a fee waiver system will increase the number of people who file 
to benefit from an automatic stay, with no intention of 
following through to a discharge.39  
In the American context, some commentators assert that a fee 
waiver system is unnecessary because the filing fees can be paid 
in installments, and as such access to the system is denied only 
in rare circumstances.40 Otis B. Grant argues that the filing fee 
must be retained because of the easy availability of discharge: if 
a debtor believes that discharge is costless, Grant asserts, he or 
she will be more likely to use it.41 Bankruptcy must have a cost, 
he states, because otherwise creditors will shift the cost of 
bankruptcy to the buyers of goods.42 Lastly, Michael Markham 
and Bethann Scharrer argue that proceeding in a bankruptcy case 
is “nothing more than a privilege,” and thus “it seems logical 
that proceeding in forma pauperis in bankruptcy is also only a 
privilege.”43 
Harry Sommer succinctly states the argument in favour of being 
able to proceed forma pauperis in bankruptcy filings: “Equal 
justice under the law.”44 His response to the argument that the 
filing fee is low enough, and can be paid in installments, is that 
“…those who make [the argument] must be shockingly 
                                                                                                            
brary/fjc_catalog.nsf/Publication!openform&parentunid=76FF032DF9BA521B
85256CA300688AE3 >at 21.  
39 Ibid. at 22. 
40 Ibid. at 22. 
41 Otis B. Grant, “Are the Indigent Too Poor for Bankruptcy? A Critical Legal 
Interpretation of the Theory of Fresh Start within a Law and Economics 
Paradigm” (2002) 33 Univ. Toledo L. Rev. 773 at 792. 
42 Ibid. at 793. 
43 Markham & Scharrer, supra note 32 at 83. 
44 Harry Sommer, “In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: The Time has Long 
since Come” (1994) 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 93 at 97. 
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unfamiliar with the plight of those in poverty in this country.”45 
Sommer notes that people file for bankruptcy for other reasons 
than to protect assets: to prevent a utility shutoff, to protect a 
driver’s licence, to participate in a government program, to 
prevent garnishment of wages (which is allowed in some states), 
or to fend off harassing or abusive calls from creditors/collection 
agencies.46 He considers the fears of overburdening the court 
system with more paperwork to be overstated,47 and argues that 
the solution to abuse is not to restrict access to the system but 
to address problem directly: the possibility that some might 
abuse the system is not a reason to reject a proposed reform.48 
V. MODELS FOR REFORM 
A number of jurisdictions have followed on concerns such as 
those expressed by Sommer, recognized that it can be difficult 
for poor debtors to file for bankruptcy due to the associated 
costs, and have identified forms of relief that assist poor debtors 
in obtaining a fresh start. The following section documents the 
available and proposed bankruptcy services for the poor across 
the United States, Australia, New Zealand, England and Wales, 
and the Netherlands. 
                                            
45 Ibid. at 100. Notice that Sommer’s statements reflect the findings on the 
need for bankruptcy for the poor from our interviews of Canadian bankruptcy 
trustees. 
46 Ibid. at 103-104. See also Susan D. Kovac, “Judgement-Proof Debtors in 
Bankruptcy” (1991) 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 675 at 678-681 for a discussion of the 
benefits and costs of bankruptcy for judgement-proof debtors; and Nathaniel 
C. Nichols, “The Poor Need Not Apply: Moralistic Barriers to Bankruptcy’s 
Fresh Start (1993-1994) 25 Rutgers L.J. 329 at 351-353, where he points out 
that filing for bankruptcy is an effective way for a poor family to prevent the 
stoppage of a utility service, while providing for a fresh beginning with the 
utility service.  
47 Sommer, supra note 43 at 105. 
48 Ibid. at 107. 
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A. UNITED STATES 
Title 28 of the United States Code represents the American in 
forma pauperis statute, allowing an individual to file civil 
actions in federal courts without paying the requisite filing fee.49 
A person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must file an 
affidavit showing an inability to pay the associated costs.50 
Section 1930 governs the payment of fees in bankruptcy courts. 
As the statute was previously worded, bankruptcy courts did not 
fall under the definition of a “court of the United States”, and 
therefore had no authority to allow in forma pauperis 
proceedings.51 A 1973 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that there was no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of 
one’s debts in bankruptcy, concluding that the fee provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code at the time were not an unconstitutional 
denial of due process rights.52 Thus, the legislation and 
jurisprudence previously precluded the application of Title 28 to 
the initial filing fee for a bankruptcy petition.53  
Under section 418 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (and codified at Title 28 of the 
United States Code), however, individual Chapter 7 filers may 
now file an application to waive the filing fee at the same time 
as they file the bankruptcy petition.54 Under the new legislation, 
a district or bankruptcy court may waive the filing fee for an 
individual debtor who (a) has income less than 150 per cent of 
the poverty guidelines last established by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services; and (b) is unable to pay that fee 
                                            
49 Markham & Scharrer, supra note 32 at 73. 
50 Ibid. at 77. 
51 See ibid. at 80 for an overview of the decisions which have held that 
bankruptcy courts are not courts of the United States. 
52 Ibid. at 74-75; see United States v. Kras 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
53 Sommer, supra note 43 at 95. 
54 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, s. 
418, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1-3). 
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in installments.55 For individual debtors whose filing fees have 
been waived, the bankruptcy or district court may also waive 
other fees.56 The Code also allows for the payment of the filing 
fee in installments.57  
Congress implemented a pilot program in 1994 in six judicial 
districts to study the effect of waiving the $175 filing fee for 
individual Chapter 7 debtors who were unable to pay the fee in 
installments.58 The study found that an application for waiver of 
the filing fee was filed in 3.4 per cent of all non-business 
Chapter 7 cases, and granted in 2.9 per cent of the cases.59 The 
report concluded that the fee-waiver program may make the 
bankruptcy system more accessible to low-income debtors: 
almost 11 per cent of the successful fee-waiver applicants stated 
that they would not have filed for bankruptcy had there been no 
fee-waiver program.60 In particular, the committee concluded 
that the program may have enhanced access to the bankruptcy 
system for indigent single women.61 Debtors whose filing fees 
were waived were more likely to obtain a discharge compared to 
debtors whose applications were denied.62 The report noted that 
                                            
55 “Judicial Conference of the United States Interim Procedures Regarding the 
Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005” (11 August 2005), online: U.S. Courts 
<http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/jcusguidelines.html>. 
56 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(2). The fees that may be waived are those prescribed 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(b) and (c). 
57 Bankruptcy Rule 1006; 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a). Upon petition, the court may 
grant leave to pay in installments. The number of installments shall not 
exceed four, and the final installment shall be payable not later than 120 days 
after filing the petition. For cause shown, the court may extend the time of 
any installment, provided the last installment is paid not later than 180 days 
after filing the petition. 
58 See Wiggins et al., supra note 37.  
59 Ibid. at 1. 
60 Ibid. at 4. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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there was an increase overall in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings 
during the period of study, complicating the assessment of 
whether the program increased Chapter 7 filings. The study 
concluded, however, that only a “small fraction” of the 
increased filings were due to the program.63 Assuming 
applications would be filed and granted at the same rate as 
occurred in the pilot program, the study predicted that a 
national fee-waiver program would cost approximately $4.7 
million in lost filing fees, $74,000 in waived miscellaneous fees 
for in forma pauperis debtors, and $1.5 million in salary for 
additional office clerk personnel (a total cost of approximately 
$6.3 million).64 To fund the program, the study recommended 
that Congress increase the judiciary’s appropriation by this 
amount,65 or request authorization for application of the U.S. 
Treasury share of the filing fee to cover the cost.66  
In addition to filing fees, U.S. debtors often are confronted with 
legal fees as they navigate the complex bankruptcy process. As 
one commentator notes, it is unlikely that a no-asset Chapter 7 
filer can afford to pay a bankruptcy attorney up front.67 Without 
a retainer, a bankruptcy attorney is unlikely to pay the requisite 
filing fees or perform other pre-petition services because the 
debtor’s obligation to pay for these services are likely to be 
discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.68 Most courts have 
held that pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable, forcing 
                                            
63 Ibid. at 6. 
64 Ibid. at 12. The study did indicate that the cost might rise significantly if 
fee waivers were automatically based on a bright-line income standard. 
65 This represented 2/10 of one per cent of the judiciary’s total fiscal 
appropriation for 1997: ibid. at 13. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Kerry Heydel Ducey, “Bankruptcy, just for the Rich? an Analysis of Popular 
Fee Arrangements for Pre-Petition Legal Fees and a Call to Amend” (2001) 54 
Vand. L. Rev. 1665 at 1667. 
68 Ibid. 
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bankruptcy attorneys to “get creative” if they wish to get paid.69 
Kerry Haydel Ducey recommends exempting pre-petition 
bankruptcy attorney fees from discharge, which would in turn 
encourage counsel to represent “even the poorest of debtors” by 
removing the risks of representing those who may be unable to 
pay their legal fees in advance.70 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), 
the court may request an attorney to represent someone who is 
unable to afford counsel, although most bankruptcy judges have 
decided that they do not have the authority to do so.71  
B. AUSTRALIA 
The vast majority of bankruptcies in Australia are administered 
by Official Receivers, although bankruptcies may be 
administered by trustees from either the public or private 
sector.72 Australia’s bankruptcy regime provides 3 alternative 
bankruptcy options, two of which are low-cost options. First, 
under s. 55 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, a debtor may apply for 
bankruptcy without the need for court involvement. A debtor 
may become bankrupt by presenting a petition and statement of 
financial affairs to an Official Receiver. If the documents are in 
correct form and there is no creditor’s petition pending, the 
Official Receiver must accept the petition. The individual 
becomes bankrupt on the day the petition is accepted, and the 
Official Receiver automatically becomes the trustee unless the 
                                            
69 Ibid. at 1671. 
70 Ibid. at 1672. 
71 Richard H.W. Maloy, “Should Bankruptcy be Reserved for People Who have 
Money? Or is the Bankruptcy Court a Court of the United States?” (1997) 7 J. 
Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 at 28. The courts have generally found that due to the 
Kras decision, the section is inapplicable to bankruptcy proceedings. 
72 Rosalind Mason, “Consumer Bankruptcies: An Australian Perspective” 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449 at 453. The Official Receiver in Australia is a 
person who administers statutory functions under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
for the Australian government. 
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individual nominates a privately registered trustee.73 In most 
cases, the bankrupt will be automatically discharged after three 
years.74  
Second, bankruptcy is available under Part X of the Bankruptcy 
Act – a higher cost, more sophisticated process involving 
lawyers. Third, debt agreements under Part IX of the Bankruptcy 
Act are available to represent a low-cost alternative to 
bankruptcy for those who can afford to make some payments.75 
Proposals for debt agreements by low-income households are 
processed by the public sector.76 When debt agreements were 
introduced in 1996 they were intended as a “viable low-cost 
alternative to bankruptcy for low-income debtors with little or 
no property, with few creditors, and with low levels of liability, 
for whom entry into Part X administration is not possible 
because of inability to meet set up costs.”77 Debt agreements 
                                            
73 Ibid. Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) as amended, s. 55. 
74 The bankrupt will be automatically discharged after three years, unless (i) 
an early discharge from bankruptcy has been granted by the trustee (only 
applies to bankruptcies in existence prior to 5/5/03), (ii) an objection to 
discharge has been filed by the trustee, or (iii) the bankruptcy has been 
annulled. See ITSA, “Bankruptcy – Long Version,” online: 
<http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/bankruptcy-
>bankruptcy+-+long+version?opendocument#Discharge >. 
75 See ITSA, online: 
<http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/debt+agreements-
%3Epart+ix+debt+agreements?opendocument>. See also ITSA, “Review of 
Debt Agreements Under Part IX of the Bankruptcy Act 1966,” online: 
<http://www.imal.com.au/template/files/27/220805_Debt_Agreements_Cons
ultation_Paper.pdf> [Review of Debt Agreements]. 
76 Mason, supra note 72 at 453. When debt agreements were first introduced, 
the cap on income was set at approximately $26, 000. In 2003, this was raised 
to approximately $48, 000. Set up costs referred to here refer to Part X 
administration. 
77 Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 1996: Explanatory Memorandum, 
at para. 135.16, cited in Mason, ibid. at 456. 
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release the debtor from debts which would be provable in 
bankruptcy in the same way that bankruptcy releases his or her 
debts.78 Under this procedure, a debtor submits a proposal to the 
Official Trustee, who determines whether the debtor meets the 
eligibility requirements.79 The Insolvency and Trustee Service 
Australia (ITSA) advises creditors of the proposal and allows 
creditors to vote on it, during which time creditors’ proceedings 
are stayed for enforcement of debts.80 If the proposal is accepted 
by a majority in dollar value and at least 75 per cent of creditors 
voting before the deadline, the debt agreement becomes 
effective.81 Research conducted by the ITSA in 2003 has shown 
that 65 per cent of debtors who entered into debt agreements 
had income less than $30, 000, and “unemployment” followed 
by “excessive use of credit” were the main attributed reasons for 
insolvency.82 
Under the Australian government's cost recovery policy, the 
ITSA has adopted a formal cost recovery regime in respect of 
fees and charges payable under the Bankruptcy Act and related 
legislation. In 2004, the ITSA undertook a review of its fees and 
charges, identifying which services should be cost recovered, the 
type of charge to apply, who should pay, and which services 
would be more appropriately covered through general taxation.83 
                                            
78 Betty Weule, “Debt Agreements: can they work?” (2000) 10:1 New 
Directions in Bankruptcy 11. Note, however, that the debtor must make 
payments. 
79 The Official Trustee in Australia is the government equivalent of a 
registered private trustee. 
80 Debts or liabilities arising from a maintenance agreement or maintenance 
order are not stayed. The ITSA is the agency that becomes the trustee when a 
private bankruptcy trustee is not appointed in a bankruptcy or other 
arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act. 
81 Mason, supra note 72 at 456-457. 
82 ITSA, Review of Debt Agreements, supra note 68 at 4. 
83 Bankruptcy Legislation (Fees and Charges) Bill 2006, Bills Digest no. 110 
2005-06, online: Parliament of Australia < 
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The new fees and charges are effective from July 1, 2006. There 
is no fee for processing debtor petitions or debt agreement 
proposals.84 The review recommended that a general levy be 
imposed on debt agreements, noting that the use of debt 
agreements had steadily increased since they first became 
available.85 The government, however, decided against imposing 
a levy on debt agreements to ensure that the agreements 
“…continue to be available as a viable alternative to bankruptcy 
for many debtors.”86  
The ITSA’s Cost Recovery Impact Statement indicated that a 
$250 fee would have to be charged to recover the processing 
costs of debtors’ Section 55 petitions and debt agreement 
proposals.87 The ITSA deemed, however, that this fee would not 
be consistent with broader bankruptcy objectives in providing a 
broad community benefit and not just relief for debtors.88 During 
the consultation process, proponents of the fee argued that 
debtors receive a direct benefit, and given that debtors would 
not have the same debt servicing burdens once their petition is 
                                                                                                            
http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/pubs/BD/2005-06/06bd110.htm > [Bills 
Digest no. 110 2005-06]. 






85 Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06], supra note 75. See also ITSA, “Cost Recovery 





86 Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06], ibid.  
87 Cost Recovery Impact Statement, supra note 77 at 3. 
88 Ibid.. 
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accepted, they should be able to afford the fee.89 Critics argued 
that it would be counter-intuitive to subject debtors facing 
financial hardship to the fee and that its imposition would deny 
many debtors access to the system.90 Creditors noted that 
ultimately they would end up paying the fee in many cases, as 
debtors would choose not to pay certain bills, or would acquire 
additional credit to pay the processing fee.91 
Apart from charging no processing fees associated with Section 
55 bankruptcy petitions and debt agreements, Australia’s regime 
allows a debtor proceeding through the higher cost Part X 
bankruptcy procedure to apply to have other fees associated 
with bankruptcy waived. Examples of other fees include the 
following: a $400 fee for the issue of bankruptcy notices; an 
ITSA administration of estate fee for bankruptcy and debt 
agreements, set at $3000 plus 20 per cent of the money received; 
or for debt agreements, a fee representing 20 per cent of the 
value of the proposal accepted by creditors.92 Subregulation 16.11 
of the Bankruptcy Regulations provides for waiver or remission 
of fees by the Inspector-General, if the Inspector-General is 
reasonably satisfied that (a) payment of the fee by the person 
liable to pay it has imposed, or would impose, undue hardship 
on the person; or (b) because of other exceptional circumstances, 
it is proper and reasonable to do so.93 The regulations define 
undue hardship as “hardship that is unusual and exceptional in 
comparison to the hardship arising in the normal course of 
bankruptcy.”94  
                                            
89 Ibid. at 17-18. 
90 Ibid. at 18. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06, supra note 83.  
93 Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 – Reg. 16.11(1) and (2), online: Australasian 
Legal Information Institute 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/br1996251/s16.11.html>. 
94 Ibid., Reg. 16.11(3). 
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C. NEW ZEALAND 
The New Zealand government has recently introduced the 
Insolvency Law Reform Bill which includes a “no income no 
asset procedure” as an alternative to adjudication on a debtor’s 
application.95 The proposed reforms are set to expand the role of 
the Official Assignee, whereby all debtors will have to consult 
with an Official Assignee before invoking any of the 
proceedings, making bankruptcy an administrative procedure.96 
Under the proposed new regime, a debtor will be required to file 
a financial statement of affairs with the Official Assignee before 
pursuing bankruptcy or the no asset procedure option.97 The 
Official Assignee will not only provide advice and information, 
Thomas Telfer notes, but render substantive decisions on the 
options pursued.98 Telfer cautiously suggests that the retention 
of the Official Assignees’ monopoly over bankruptcy 
administration may avoid some of the problems associated with 
a private trustee system, such as Canada’s, where private 
trustees face potential conflicts of interest. However, Telfer does 
draw attention to the multiple roles the Official Assignee will 
                                            
95 Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill (April 2004), online: Ministry of 
Economic Development (New Zealand) 
<http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/21201/draft-bill.pdf > [Draft Insolvency 
Law Reform Bill]. 
96 Thomas G.W. Telfer, “New Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform: The New 
Role of the Official Assignee and the Prospects for a No-Asset Regime” in 
Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective, Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, 
Iain Ramsay & William C. Whitford, eds. (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2003) 247 at 248. The Official Assignee is a statutory position 
created by the Insolvency Act 1967. When an Official Assignee is appointed 
to act in respect of a bankruptcy, they act as an officer of the court. 
97 Ibid. at 257; Insolvency Law Reform Bill, Explanatory Note, online: 
<http://www.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpprint/docs/bills/20050141.txt> 
[Explanatory Note].  
98 Telfer, ibid. at 257. 
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have to play under the proposed reforms and the potential for 
conflicts.99 
The New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development describes 
the no asset procedure as providing “…an alternative to 
bankruptcy for insolvent debtors with nominal debts, no assets 
and who have no means to repay the debt.”100 Part 5, subpart 4 of 
the bill sets out the rules relating to the no asset procedure. The 
starting point is the same for proceeding in bankruptcy: 
furnishing a statement of the debtor's affairs. Based on the 
statement of affairs, the Assignee will decide whether the debtor 
qualifies for entry to the no asset procedure. The bill outlines 
criteria for entry to the no asset procedure: no assets, total debts 
between $1,000 and $40,000, no means to repay any amount, 
and a clean financial record (not previously bankrupt, not 
previously admitted to the no asset procedure).101 Once admitted 
to the no asset procedure, the debtor enjoys a moratorium on his 
or her debts—with some exceptions, they cannot be enforced 
while the debtor is in the no asset procedure. After 12 months, 
the debtor is discharged and the debts are cancelled.102 However, 
if the no asset procedure terminates at any time before the 12-
month period has elapsed, the debtor's debts will become 
enforceable.103  
                                            
99 Ibid. at 258-259.  
100 Ministry of Economic Development, “Bankruptcy Administration: No 
Asset Procedure and Insolvency Act Changes – Regulatory Impact 




101 See Explanatory Note, supra note 88; Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill, 
supra note 86, cl. 347. 
102 Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill, ibid., cl. 357. 
103 Ibid., cl. 356. 
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The Assignee will have a limited role in the process because the 
debtor by definition has no assets: he or she must ensure that an 
applicant is qualified for entry, provide creditors with an 
opportunity to object to a debtor being admitted to the no asset 
procedure, ensure that a debtor who has been admitted 
improperly is removed, and terminate the no asset procedure at 
the request of the debtor if the Assignee is satisfied that the 
debtor, through changed circumstances, can make payment 
towards his or her debts.104 The benefit of the no asset procedure 
is that an individual’s debts are cancelled on discharge. Telfer 
notes that the Official Assignee will have to play a gate-keeping 
function through the control of access to the regime.105 He 
argues that if the no asset procedure adopted by Parliament 
incorporates a number of subjective standards (such as entry 
criteria to determine who may access the procedure), the 
benefits of a streamlined no fault bankruptcy procedure will be 
lost.106  
Under the system currently in place in New Zealand, a debtor 
may apply to a District Court for a summary installment order if 
his or her debts amount to less than $12 000, where a District 
Court Judge makes an order that is binding on creditors. An 
installment order provides that a debtor may pay back his or her 
debts without the threat of legal action while the order is in 
force; the process is administered by a third party supervisor and 
imposes no costs on the debtor.107 If a debtor decides to petition 
for bankruptcy, there is a $40 filing fee in the High Court, 
although a debtor may apply to have the fee waived if he or she 
                                            
104 Ibid., cl. 347-351, 354, and 355. See also Explanatory Note, supra note 88. 
105 Telfer, supra note 96 at 265. 
106 Ibid. at 268. 
107 Insolvency and Trustee Service (New Zealand), Personal Bankruptcy 
Toolkit, online: <www.insolvency.gov.nz/its-docs/I/its-bankruptcy-manual-
28June.pdf> at 6. 
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cannot afford the cost.108 However, if a debtor wishes to apply for 
an early discharge (prior to the end of the three year period) she 
must retain counsel and appear in the High Court at 
considerable expense. 
D. ENGLAND AND WALES 
England and Wales have also embarked on insolvency law 
reform, proposing a no income, no asset (NINA) procedure 
similar to that in New Zealand. In 2004, the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (DCA) published a consultation paper 
entitled “A Choice of Paths: better options to manage over-
indebtedness and multiple debt.”109 With regard to “can’t pay”110 
debtors, the paper proposed two options: the introduction of a 
court-based debt relief order and a NINA procedure.111 Under the 
former option, a debtor would be released from his or her debts 
after 12 months unless a creditor could provide evidence of non-
declared assets. The recommendations for this option included a 
debt limit and an unspecified fee for debtors to enter the 
scheme.112 Since the publication of this report, the England and 
Wales’ insolvency service has focused on the latter NINA 
option, and developed what it deems “…a non-court based 
scheme of debt relief that would alleviate debt in certain cases 
where there is currently no realistic alternative, but which is 
                                            
108 Ibid. at 7. 
109 Department for Constitutional Affairs, “A Choice of Paths: better options 




110 “Can’t pay” in this context refers to debtors who cannot pay off their debts 
as opposed to debtors who cannot pay trustee fees. 
111 Ibid. at 43. 
112 Ibid. 
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simple and likely to be relatively cheap to administer.”113 The 
scheme is aimed at those people who cannot pay “even a portion 
of their debt within a reasonable timeframe”114—people with no 
assets, very little income, and a relatively low level of liabilities, 
and who cannot access any of the debt solutions available (such 
as bankruptcy).115  
In March 2005, the Insolvency Service published a paper for 
discussion focusing solely on the NINA procedure, recognizing 
that “[t]here is a category of person who has fallen into debt and 
has no way out of it.”116 U.K. research has shown that “the great 
majority of people who fall into arrears with their household 
bills or credit commitments do so because they are in financial 
difficulty resulting from a change in circumstance or living long 
term on a low income.”117 These debtors simply lack the money 
to make payments on time, and include people on low incomes 
who face unexpected expenditure, people who have had a 
sudden substantial fall in income leaving them unable to meet 
all their commitments, and people with mental health problems 
which impair their ability to manage their finances.118 In England 
and Wales, the current fee to petition for bankruptcy is £310, 
even if the debtor qualifies for remission of or exemption from 
court fees. The current fee for administering bankruptcy is 
                                            
113 The Insolvency Service (United Kingdom), “Relief for the Indebted – An 
Alternative to Bankruptcy” (March 2005), online: 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc
_register/consultationpaperwithnewannex1.pdf > at 5 [“Relief for the 
Indebted”]. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. at 18. 
116 Ibid. at 12. 
117 Nicola Dominy & Elaine Kempson, “Can't Pay or Won't Pay?: A Review of 
Creditor and Debtor Approaches to the Non-Payment of Bills” (2003). For a 
summary of the report, see Department for Constitutional Affairs (United 
Kingdom), online: <http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2003/4-03es.htm>. 
118 Ibid. 
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£1625.119 Ideally, the U.K. report notes, each bankruptcy estate 
should cover the costs of its administration. However, this does 
not always occur, with the result of bankruptcies where there 
are assets subsidizing those where there are none. Waiving the 
£310 fee, the report argues, would mean that cross subsidization 
between cases would increase.120 
The NINA scheme proposed by the paper would be operated by 
Official Receivers, who would be responsible for making debt 
relief orders that would result in debtors being discharged from 
their debts after a period of one year. The procedure would 
require an up front entry fee, but less than the deposit required 
to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. As well, debtors would have 
to meet certain criteria to make use of the scheme.121 The 
consultation paper proposed a restriction on number of times a 
person could apply for an order, and recommended the use of an 
approved intermediary to collect information about the debtor’s 
affairs, assist in filling out forms, and filter unsuitable 
applicants.122 To balance the rights of creditors, the paper 
suggested a means for creditors to object to the making of an 
order on various grounds, such as failure to disclose assets, 
income or liabilities.123 The scheme would preserve the ultimate 
right of appeal to the courts. 
After the consultation paper was published and comments 
received, the Insolvency Service published a second paper 
                                            
119 “Relief for the Indebted,” supra note 113 at 13. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See ibid. at 25-28 for possible entry criteria: total liabilities of less than £15 
000, a surplus income of no more than £50 per month after necessary living 
expenses, and no realizable assets over £300. 
122 Ibid. at 23. 
123 Ibid. at 31. 
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highlighting the responses.124 The paper put forth the following 
recommendations: 125 
• an up front, non-refundable fee paid by debtor to administer 
the debt order relief scheme, no more than £100;126 
• an administrative order, without the intervention of the 
courts; 
• a restriction on the number of times a debtor can obtain an 
order (no more than once every six years); 
• the use of an approved intermediary by the debtor when 
applying for an order, with intermediaries to be properly 
funded; 
• a cap on permitted liabilities of £15 000;127 
• a cap on surplus income of £50 per month with surplus 
income determined through a common financial statement, 
with the ability to review the cap so it can be amended if 
appropriate; 
• an asset limit at £300, but kept under review so it can be 
amended if appropriate; and  
• provision for an appropriate range of remedies to tackle 
misconduct by the debtor.128 
More recently, the U.K. government has put forward 
recommendations for the other option identified in the 2004 
                                            
124 The Insolvency Service (United Kingdom), “Relief for the Indebted -- an 
Alternative to Bankruptcy: Summary of Responses and Government Reply” 




125 Ibid., at 5-7. 
126 For further detail, see ibid. at 12-13. 
127 The paper recommends that secured debt be included for the purposes of 
ascertaining the level of liabilities; the position of secured creditors would 
not be affected as they would retain their security. Ibid. at 22. 
128 See ibid. at 31-35 for further detail. 
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report: the availability of a court based debt relief order. Rather 
than implementing a court-based debt relief order, however, the 
DCA has advocated the administrative NINA scheme, deeming 
the court-based option not cost effective for “can’t pay” 
debtors.129 These reforms are encompassed in the Draft 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill as a means to provide 
debt relief for people in England and Wales who cannot access 
currently available remedies, and who have no way to pay what 
they owe.130  
An annex to the bill outlines the various options considered by 
the U.K. government for “can’t pay” debtors: removing the 
requirement for people without assets or surplus income to pay 
a deposit when presenting a petition for bankruptcy; persuading 
creditors to voluntarily write off debt where there is no prospect 
that the debt will be paid within a reasonable amount of time; or 
introducing legislation to enable poor people who are financially 
excluded to access a system of debt relief.131 Preferring a 
legislative response, the report suggests that the proposal for the 
NINA scheme would benefit the indebted individual in terms of 
reduced stress and the effect on health accompanying it,132 
provide an opportunity for a fresh start and allow him or her to 
“learn to manage their finances in more favourable 
                                            
129 Administration Orders, Enforcement Restriction Orders and Non-Court 
Based Debt Management Schemes (July 2006), online: <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm68/6885/6885.pdf > at 109. 
130 The Insolvency Service, “Plans to Bring Debt Relief to the Socially 
Excluded,” n.d., online: 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/intermed
iariesworkingroup/debtrelief.htm>. 
131 Department for Constitutional Affairs (United Kingdom), Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessments, Part V, “Debt 
Relief Orders – full RIA” (July 2006), online: <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm68/6885/6885.pdf > at 117-118. 
132 Ibid. at 126. 
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circumstances”,133 and free up court time in cases where 
creditors are pursuing enforcement action where there is no 
hope of repayment.134 The DCA anticipates the scheme will 
entail initial set up costs, but with an upfront fee (less than 
current bankruptcy deposit), it will be possible to meet ongoing 
administration costs.135 The DCA predicts the number of people 
who would use the NINA scheme would plateau at 34, 000 to 
36, 000 after two years, and would increase or decrease with the 
number of bankruptcies after that point.136 Approximately 11 per 
cent of people currently presenting a bankruptcy petition would 
be eligible for the new scheme.137 The scheme, the DCA 
predicts, will apply to a substantial portion of those seeking 
advice for debt related problems, who owe less than the 
proposed liability cap of £15, 000 and/or are not homeowners.138  
The NINA procedure is not currently in effect in England and 
Wales.  
E. THE NETHERLANDS 
The Dutch bankruptcy procedure is of relatively recent origin, 
dating back only to 1998. Accordingly, a less detailed account is 
provided of this system. The Dutch experience is especially 
relevant to this paper because the majority of the overindebted 
in the Netherlands are poor in the sense used in our discussion 
of the Canadian situation. Prior to the introduction of a 
bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands, insolvent debtors 
could attempt to come to voluntary agreement with their 
                                            
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. at 127. 
135 Ibid. at 129-130. 
136 Ibid. at 115. 
137 Ibid. at 127. 
138 Ibid. at 115. 
38 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 02 
 
creditors, aided by counsellors from non-profit organizations.139 
Failing that, judicial enforcement of the debts would generally 
lead to all of the debtor’s income above the social minimum140 
being assigned to the creditors. 
The 1998 bankruptcy law is known by its Dutch acronym 
WSNB (wet schuldsanering natuurlijke personen or law on debt 
rehabilitation of natural persons).141 From a North American 
perspective, the WSNB is more similar to a lengthy court-
ordered repayment plan than to a fresh start. Eligible debtors 
must agree to live at the social minimum for three years, giving 
over the remainder of their income to their creditors. The 
agreement is supervised by court-appointed trustee who 
monitors the debtor’s financial situation with the aid of a 
“postblokkade” which involves all of the debtor’s mail being 
opened by the trustee.142 Debtors can use the WSNB only if they 
                                            
139 The main actors in this area are the network of municipal banks (known 
by their Dutch acronym, VKB) which are supervised and funded by Dutch 
municipalities. Apart from the VKB, debt counselling is done by an array of 
government social welfare agencies, non-profit organizations and church 
groups. 
140 The “social minimum serves as a policy boundary by which people have 
access to sufficient financial resources to achieve a ‘minimum acceptable 
lifestyle’ for the Netherlands.” 
http://internationalezaken.szw.nl/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_rubriek&rubrie
k_id=190093 (viewed 17 December 2006). Used for a variety of purposes, the 
social minimum was 578.24 a month for a single person and 1,156.54 for a 
couple in 2004-2005. 
141 See www.wsnp.rvr.org, a website devoted to the WSNP for details about 
the law  
142 For an English language description of the Dutch law see Jason Kilborn, 
“The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for the 
New U.S. Law From Unexpected Parallel in the Netherlands” (2006) 39 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 77. See also Huls, Nick, Nadja 
Jungmann and Bert Niemayer, “Can Voluntary Debt Settlement and 
Consumer Bankruptcy Coexist? The Development of Dutch Bankruptcy 
Law” in (eds.) Niemi-Kiesilainen, Johanna, Iain Ramsay and William 
Whitford, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparative Context, (Oxford: Hart 
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have previously tried, and failed, to come to a voluntary 
agreement with their creditors.143 
In Jason Kilborn’s 2006 article, he makes reference to a 1997 
report that 71 percent of debtors seeking debt counselling had 
income less than $12,000 (roughly the Dutch social 
minimum).144 The director of a prominent municipal bank (or 
VKB in its Dutch acronym) in the northeast of Holland recently 
reported that roughly 80 per cent of those seeking debt 
counselling relied on social welfare payments.145 These debtors 
pay no out-of-pocket costs for either debt counselling or for their 
participation in the WSNB. All costs are paid either by 
municipal governments (which pays the counsellors an annual 
fee for each of their activities) or by the creditors. The various 
costs of the WSNB, such as the fee paid to the court-appointed 
trustee, are drawn from the payments made by the debtor from 
their income above the social minimum. In effect, since these 
funds would otherwise accrue to the creditors, creditors pay for 
these services.  
                                                                                                            
Publishing, 2003). In addition, Nadja Jungmann recently published her Ph.D. 
thesis on Dutch insolvency law. See 
http://www.aup.nl/do.php?a=show_visitor_booklist&b=auteursaz&auteur=Ju
ngmann%2C+Nadja.  
143 One of the unintended side-effects of the introduction of the WSNB has 
been the declining rate of successful voluntary agreements. The success rate 
has fallen to about 10% after being close to 50% early in the 1990s. The 
intended effect of the WSNB was exactly the opposite—to increase the 
success rate of voluntary agreements. By paying the costs of the judicial 
procedure from payments that would otherwise have gone to creditors, the 
framers of the legislation hoped to make the judicial procedure relatively 
unattractive. However, creditors seem to believe that the benefits of the 
oversight of the court-appointed trustee are large enough to offset the 
relatively small increased cost. See Huls. et al.,ibid. 
144 Kilborn 2006, supra 142 at 13. 
145Interview with Harro Norder, director of the Volkscredietbank Noord-Ost, 
December 2006.  
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Middle-class overindebtedness is relatively rare in the 
Netherlands. While the use of consumer credit is rising, it 
remains well below the level of other European countries and far 
below North American levels. The requirement that debtors 
using the WSNB live at the social minimum for three years is 
therefore less burdensome than it would be if the majority of 
debtors were not already living at that level. 
In summary, the Dutch bankruptcy system disproportionately 
serves poor debtors who rely on social welfare payments. No 
out-of-pocket costs must be paid by the debtor to gain access to 
the judicial debt adjustment procedure or to use the debt 
counsellors provided by the municipalities. That said, the 
WSNB does not provide the sort of fresh start that is available in 
the other jurisdictions canvassed. 
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VI. POSSIBLE MODELS FOR THE CANADIAN 
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
The most problematic aspect of the current Canadian system is 
that depending on where they live, poor debtors in Canada 
apparently face different prospects for being able to access the 
bankruptcy system and face different costs for doing so. In each 
interview, drawing on the Australian model, we suggested an 
option that would see poor debtors fill out a simple set of forms 
and then go to a kiosk in the local shopping mall where the 
forms and supporting documents could be filed and the 
bankruptcy accomplished. We also discussed a variant in which 
a trustee (or other qualified insolvency professional) might 
assess the debtor’s case before he or she was eligible to use the 
kiosk. None of the trustees interviewed thought that either 
option was a good idea. 
A. TRUSTEE’S VIEWS ON POSSIBLE MODELS 
1. UNANIMITY AGAINST A GOVERNMENT-OPERATED SYSTEM 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the private trustees that we 
interviewed were unanimous in rejecting the idea of a new 
government-funded and government-staffed program that would 
handle the bankruptcies of poor debtors. Several recognized that 
their opposition would be expected given that any new 
government-provided service would compete with their own 
practice. However, it seems clear that their opposition goes 
beyond simple self-interest.  
The trustees agreed that a trained professional should be fairly 
closely involved in order to handle unexpected situations. One 
noted that the “trustee learns more about the cases over the 
nine months, information that would not be available at the 
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time of application.”146 With this in mind, all of the trustees we 
spoke to expressed the belief that a government program would 
require one of two unpalatable staffing options. One option 
would involve the training of a whole new cadre of insolvency 
professionals to replace the work now done by trustees. The 
trustees saw little benefit in training a new group to undertake 
work that they themselves have been trained to do. A second 
option would be to use less well-trained staff on the assumption 
that poor debtors will have simple bankruptcy cases; the 
trustees thought that such staff would not be able to handle the 
particularities that often arise even in simple cases. Several 
harked back to the days of Federal Insolvency Trustee Agency 
(FITA) which seems to be universally reviled as having failed 
because of the incompetence of its staff.147 One said that there 
are “lots of horror stories from FITA. Files that never got closed, 
people not getting real assets.”148 Another believed that “the 
government employees [of FITA] were not qualified [to 
administer bankruptcies].”149 Still another asserted that “the 
system collapsed because the government was not equipped to 
handle it and debtors were not advised properly” and that 
                                            
146 Interview with Trustee 2, 8 September 2006. 
147 The federal government introduced FITA in 1972 to provide services for 
those debtors who could not afford a trustee. By 1977, between one third and 
one half of bankruptcies proceeded under FITA. The program was 
discontinued in 1979: Igor Livshits, James McGee & Michèle Tertilt, 
“Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies in Canada and the 
United States,” (9 March 2005) online: York University Department of 
Economics <http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/seminars/2004-
2005/BankruptcyRise.pdf#search=%22FITA%20bankruptcy%22>. Despite 
the oft-heard opinion that FITA was disastrous because bankruptcies were 
mishandled by incompetent or poorly trained staff, we have seen no 
documentary evidence of the shortcomings of FITA. 
148 Interview with Truste 8, 8 September 2006. 
149 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. 
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“debtors were not discharged [because] the system was not 
tracking them.”150  
2. Unanimity Against Making Access Too Easy  
The trustees we interviewed had either participated in a BAP 
case or worked on a number of files with less than $500 in 
receipts. All but one were working in firms in which a large part 
of the work was in consumer bankruptcy and all showed 
considerable understanding and sympathy for the plight of poor 
debtors. Nonetheless, even these trustees felt strongly that 
bankruptcy should not be made too easy and that the absence of 
significant barriers would lead to the abuse of credit and to the 
abuse of the bankruptcy system.  
Apart from their concerns about the staffing of the kiosks, the 
trustees felt that the kiosk option (or any sort of “car wash” 
form of bankruptcy) would not provide enough rehabilitation 
(such as they believe arises from mandatory bankruptcy 
counselling). A system that allowed too easy a discharge would 
not teach the debtor any lessons about the misuse of credit and 
would presumably lead to repeated credit trouble. One trustee 
felt that counselling made debtors face their responsibility for 
incurring the debts that led to the bankruptcy and thought that 
bankruptcy “shouldn’t be a wash.”151 Others152 were concerned 
that the debtors would not learn anything if the procedure were 
too simple: “They need to learn something so they don’t come 
back.”153 Another thought that in the current system, “the 
debtors have responsibilities—to get counselling, to report 
                                            
150 Interview with Trustee 1, 18 August 2006. 
151 Interview with Trustee 8, 8 September 2006. 
152 Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006; Interview with Trustee 3, 8 
September 2006. 
153 Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2008. 
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changes in their situation, to make monthly payments, to turn 
over their financial affairs to the trustee.”154 
B. OPTIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A review of the systemic attempts to address the issue of access 
to bankruptcy for the poor in the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, England and Wales, and Netherlands presents two 
main options for reform to the Canadian system: 
i. Fee waiver provisions in bankruptcy proceedings; and/or 
ii. A no income no asset procedure with either a public or 
private intermediary. 
The experience of the American pilot project undertaken in the 
mid-1990s suggests the number of bankruptcy filings will not 
increase significantly with the availability of a fee waiver 
system. Australia and New Zealand are the only jurisdictions to 
provide no fee options to process debtor petitions or debt 
agreement proposals. Although the Australian government has 
considered adopting fees to help fund the system, it has recently 
concluded that this would conflict with the public policy 
objectives of the Australian bankruptcy system, and as such it is 
more appropriate that the processing costs be funded by 
taxpayers. 
Australia, New Zealand, and England and Wales have all 
adopted or considered administrative solutions to assist low 
income debtors. Australia’s Section 55 system for example 
allows individuals to quickly be declared bankrupt without the 
involvement of the courts. Recognizing that poor debtors require 
an alternative to filing for bankruptcy in the courts, England and 
Wales and New Zealand are proposing NINA procedures where 
debtors may obtain a discharge after one year. The advantages of 
                                            
154 Ibid. 
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these procedures include a streamlined, out-of-court, less costly 
process for the debtor. In the Netherlands, where the poor are 
the majority of those seeking debt resolution, debtors pay no 
fees. 
C. RECENT CANADIAN REFORM EFFORTS 
During the deliberations of the Canadian Personal Insolvency 
Task Force (PITF), a subgroup was assigned to address issues 
around the “administration process.” The subgroup quickly 
became focused on the idea of creating a “fast track” process for 
the many bankruptcy files that are quite simple, involving no 
significant assets and little prospect of creditors receiving any 
significant dividends. 
A key decision, made without extensive open discussion, was 
that the “fast track” process would lie within the existing 
Canadian bankruptcy system. The essential features of that 
system—the administration of bankruptcies by private sector 
trustees, fees paid to trustees who have the discretion to ask for 
voluntary payments, and substantial information provided to 
creditors and to the OSB—would be maintained. The primary 
alternative—a public system with low fees and limited 
information provided either to creditors or to the OSB—was not 
seriously discussed despite the efforts of Iain Ramsay, one of the 
subgroup members. In a discussion on the Australian system, 
the subgroup wrote that, given the current Canadian system, a 
shift to a system with the role of trustee filled by a public actor 
would be “politically unfeasible.”155 
The definition of eligibility for the “fast track” process was not 
based on any notion of the need for low-cost bankruptcy 
services. The subgroup mentioned that there are no reliable data 
                                            
155 “Preliminary Draft #2” (PITF subgroup deliberations, 27 November 2000) 
[unpublished] at 6. 
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suggesting that there is an issue with access to bankruptcy for 
poor debtors,156 and one member questioned whether the 
subgroup should address affordability at all.157 Instead, “fast 
track” bankruptcies would be those that seemed to be pose few 
administrative burdens. In its recommendations for the 
summary process, the subgroup suggested that trustees need not 
produce a section 170 report in cases where first-time bankrupts 
receive an automatic discharge, have no oppositions filed, have 
no surplus income, and pose no other issues.158 The group also 
recommended that the OSB letter of comment, which was 
mandatory in the previous system, become optional at the OSB’s 
discretion.159 Because “fast track” debtors would have no 
significant assets and no income above the OSB’s Surplus 
Income Guidelines, their cases would require less trustee time 
to dispose of their assets or collect Surplus Income payments.  
                                            
156 Ibid. at 9. 
157 John Eisner quoted in “Record of Decision From Conference Call” (PITF 
subgroup deliberations, 15 November 2000) [unpublished]. 
158 Synopsis of Working Group 1 Recommendations: Summary Process” (PITF 
subgroup deliberations,) [unpublished] at 3. Section 170 of the BIA provides 
that as part of the bankruptcy discharge process, the trustee must prepare a 
report in the prescribed form with respect to: 
(a) the affairs of the bankrupt, 
(b) the causes of his bankruptcy, 
(c) the manner in which the bankrupt has performed the duties imposed 
on him under this Act or obeyed the orders of the court, 
(d) the conduct of the bankrupt both before and after the date of the 
initial bankruptcy event, 
(e) whether the bankrupt has been convicted of any offence under this 
Act, and 
(f) any other fact, matter or circumstance that would justify the court in 
refusing an unconditional order of discharge. 
159 Ibid, at 4.  
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The subgroup (and the PITF as a whole) decided not to tackle the 
controversial issue of the fees charged by the trustees. Within 
the framework of Rule 128(1),160 trustees set these fees 
themselves (often by asking for voluntary payments), 
presumably in line with what the market will bear. The 
subgroup recommended more transparency in trustee fees, with 
some members suggesting that allowing trustees to advertise 
their prices might create competition, drive prices down, and 
give “incentives for efficiency in administration.”161 However, 
other members expressed reservations, as “debtors 
contributions…are subject to change during a bankruptcy, 
making it impossible to fix a cost.”162 If the “fast track” 
procedure leads to a lower amount of time spent on most cases, 
competition among trustees may lead to lower fees. However, 
the market for trustee services is far from the model of perfect 
competition since trustees must be licensed (limiting the supply 
of those authorized to administer bankruptcies), there is at least 
the possibility of collusion among trustees in establishing fees 
(via practices on voluntary payments), and consumer 
information is quite imperfect. Several of the trustees we 
interviewed thought that competition would not drive down 
fees. 
The Joint CAIRP/IIC submission to the Standing Senate 
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce163 acknowledges 
that the dissenting members of the PITF raised several issues in 
respect of access to the process that require further investigation 
and study, including: how the costs of an alternative process 
would be covered; how access for such debtors would be 
increased through any alternative process; and how the integrity 
                                            
160 See supra page 8 for a detailed discussion. 
161 Preliminary Draft #2, supra note 156 at 9. 
162 Guylaine Houle quoted in “Record of Decision” (PITF subgroup 
deliberations, 1 December 2000) [unpublished]. 
163 CAIRP/IIC Joint Submission 2003, at 68-69. 
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of the system would be maintained or enhanced. CAIRP/IIC 
made two recommendations in respect of access to information 
and assistance to debtors with no assets and no income. First, 
they recommended that where bankruptcy would be a helpful 
remedy, “there should be enhanced information to debtors 
regarding their options, including greater awareness of the 
trustee referral program [the BAP].” Second, they recommended 
that “for individuals who do not even need access to the 
system…the Superintendent’s office, by enhancing its current 
information dissemination, could address issues such as 
garnishees and how to get them lifted or reduced; how to stop 
harassing phone calls from collection agencies; strategies to deal 
with temporary layoffs and salary reductions; and key telephone 
numbers through which to access these remedies and other 
public agencies.”164  
Neither of the CAIRP/IIC recommendations were adopted in the 
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade 
and Commerce [Senate Report].165 The Senate Report did not 
address trustee fees directly.166 While the PITF Final Report did 
include many of the subgroup’s recommendations, it did not 
explicitly refer to a “fast track” process, but suggest reforming 
the current system in such a way that section 170 reports and 
OSB letters of comment are produced “by exception rather than 
                                            
164 Ibid. 
165 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce, “Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement 
Act” (November 2003), online: Senate of Canada, Banking, Trade and 
Commerce Committee <www.senate-senat.ca/bancom.asp> [Senate Report]. 
166 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce, “Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement 
Act” (November 2003), online: Senate of Canada, Banking, Trade and 
Commerce Committee <www.senate-senat.ca/bancom.asp> [Senate Report]. 
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by rule.”167 The PITF Final Report agreed with the subgroup that 
in simple bankruptcy cases, without complicating factors like 
surplus income or an opposition filed, there should not be a 
requirement that the trustee produce a section 170 report.168 As 
well, if the OSB does not feel that there are issues or problems, 
the PITF recommended that it not be required to issue a letter of 
comment.169 The Senate Report largely endorsed the PITF Final 
Report’s “by exception rather than by rule” proposal, writing 
that the changes would “respect the fundamental principles of 
efficiency and effectiveness.”170 Unlike the PITF subgroup, the 
Senate Report recognized that “access to the bankruptcy system 
is increasingly compromised for low-asset, low-income debtors,” 
although it did not recommend adopting a NINA process.171  
Most recently, Statute c. 47172 has followed the 
recommendations of the PITF Final Report and proposed the 
following revision to section 170(1) of the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act (BIA): “The trustee shall, in the prescribed 
circumstances and at the prescribed times, prepare a report, in 
the prescribed form, with respect to…” The previous wording 
simply stated, “The trustee shall prepare a report in the 
                                            
167 Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Final Report, (Ottawa: 
Personal Insolvency Task Force, 2002) [PITF Final Report] at 55. 
168 Ibid. at 57. 
169 Ibid. at 62. 
170 Senate Report, supra note 166 at 38. 
171 Ibid., at 168. 
172 An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors 
Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st 
Sess., 38th Parl., 2005 (received Royal Assent on 25 November 2005; not 
currently in force), online: Parliament of Canada < 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Pa
rl=38&Ses=1&Mode=1&Pub=Bill&Doc=C-55_4 > [Statute c. 47]. 
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prescribed form with respect to…”173 The clause-by-clause 
briefing for the proposed legislation states that the rationale 
behind the revision is to streamline the process by limiting the 
circumstances under which the report must be prepared.174 The 
briefing anticipates that a section 170 report will only be 
required where the bankrupt has Surplus Income; where an 
opposition to the bankrupt's discharge has been filed; where the 
bankrupt has been bankrupt on a previous occasion; where there 
is any reason that would require a court hearing of the discharge; 
or where the trustee, for other reasons, determines that the 
report would be required.175 
Statute c. 47 also provides for the following new section (s. 
156.1) to allow bankrupts to enter into an agreement to pay for 
the trustee’s fees after the bankruptcy period:  
An individual bankrupt who has never before been 
bankrupt under the laws of Canada or of any 
prescribed jurisdiction and who is not required to 
make payments under section 68 to the estate of the 
bankrupt may enter into an agreement with the 
trustee to pay the trustee's fees and disbursements if 
the total amount required to be paid under the 
agreement is not more than the prescribed amount and 
that total amount is to be paid before the expiry of the 
12-month period after the bankrupt's discharge. The 
                                            
173 See “BIA Discharge of bankrupts: Clause by Clause Briefing Book” (n.d.), 
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agreement may be enforced after the bankrupt's 
discharge.176 
The clause-by-clause briefing notes that this new section is 
intended 
…to provide a mechanism which will enhance 
accessibility to the insolvency system for individuals 
who do not have surplus income and who may 
otherwise have difficulty paying the costs associated 
with the administration of a bankruptcy. In some 
circumstances, especially bankruptcies with small 
estates, it is difficult for a person to find a trustee 
willing to act for them because the trustees require 
payment for their services. If the estate is too small, no 
trustee will act. This has the effect of leaving the 
vulnerable person without professional assistance 
during a difficult experience. By providing that the 
bankrupt may pay for the trustee's services after the 
bankruptcy period, the reform should ensure that more 
people get the assistance they need. Balancing this 
reform is the limit on fees that can be charged by a 
trustee pursuant to the rules.177  
                                            
176 Statute c.47, supra note 170; “BIA: Administration of Estates: Clause by 
Clause Briefing Book” (n.d.), online: Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy 
(Industry Canada) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incilp-
pdci.nsf/en/cl00813e.html>. 
177 BIA: Administration of Estates: Clause by Clause Briefing Book, ibid. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this final section of the paper, we propose three sets of 
recommendations. Each set of recommendations addresses the 
two principal flaws we believe are present in the current 
Canadian system: 
i. No national and even local uniformity exists in the 
treatment of poor debtors. 
ii. Poor debtors face informational and financial barriers that 
may impede equal access to the fresh start provided by 
bankruptcy. 
Within each set of our recommendations, there are some that 
may be implemented quite quickly and with limited cost to the 
OSB. Others will take longer to implement and will require 
additional consultation and funding. 
The two flaws highlighted by our research do not lead us to 
recommend the adoption of a separate bankruptcy scheme for 
poor debtors. Instead, following the lead of other jurisdictions, 
we recommend that Canada adopt a BAP program that 
eliminates the out-of-pocket costs for poor debtors. These costs 
could be eliminated with a combination of fee waivers (e.g., 
waiving the OSB’s filing fee) and government subsidy (e.g., 
having the OSB pay for the mandatory counselling sessions). A 
BAP program that demands no out-of-pocket payments by poor 
debtors would address the financial barriers they face. To deal 
with the informational barriers, we recommend the creation of 
an impartial agency that provides advice and support to poor 
debtors trying to deal with collection efforts. By making the 
judgement-proof status of poor debtors clear, such advice and 
support would limit the number of debtors who use the 
bankruptcy process. To increase the uniformity and certainty of 
bankruptcy across the country, we propose a method for creating 
parity while encouraging the voluntary agreements among 
trustees that exist in some cities. 
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A. REFORM OF BAP REGULATIONS 
Our research suggests that a thorough revision of the rules 
governing the operation of the BAP program is necessary. Our 
review of the program suggests that the following changes are 
highly desirable. 
 
1. WIDESPREAD AND IMPROVED PUBLICITY OF THE BAP IS REQUIRED. 
One reason for the infrequent use of the BAP is that the OSB has 
made no systematic efforts to make its existence known to poor 
debtors. Much more information on the operation of the BAP 
program should be made easily accessible to debtors and 
trustees. Detailed information on the BAP should be provided to 
poverty clinics, credit counsellors and trustees. The information 
on the OSB website related to the BAP should be updated and 
improved. The information is difficult to find and does not give 
a balanced and accurate sense of the program. For example, the 
website currently gives the impression that the BAP requires pro 
bono work by trustees. 
2. A CLEAR ELIGIBILITY STANDARD FOR THE BAP SHOULD BE PUT 
INTO PLACE. 
Further consultation should be undertaken to determine the 
exact nature of a new BAP eligibility standard. Based on our 
research to date, we recommend a standard involving low 
current income and a long-term history of receipt of government 
transfers. Using low current income alone might lead to abuse 
by debtors who only temporarily have low income. The 
appropriate requirement might be that eligible debtors must be 
in receipt of government transfers (such as income assistance, 
unemployment insurance or disability benefits) for twelve of the 
previous eighteen months. Some form of procedural fairness will 
need to be built into such a bright line eligibility standard. For 
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example, appeals should be allowed by a debtor who is newly 
poor or disabled and likely to stay that way.  
Under this new eligibility standard, the requirement that 
debtors must visit two trustees to qualify for the BAP should be 
eliminated. This requirement imposes an additional barrier to 
bankruptcy that other higher income debtors do not face. The 
current requirement has a detrimental impact on women in 
particular, as they must often find child care for their children as 
they move around the city obtaining opinions from two trustees.  
3. FEES FOR DEBTORS WHO QUALIFY FOR THE BAP SHOULD BE 
WAIVED. 
Ideally, poor debtors should be able to file for bankruptcy 
without paying any of the out-of-pocket costs. Receipts from tax 
refunds would remain in the estate as would any proceeds from 
the sale of non-exempt assets. The fee waiver could be financed 
by a combination of OSB waivers, OSB payments to trustees for 
counselling or pro bono work by trustees. Further consultation 
needs to be done with trustees, combined with a careful cost 
analysis by the OSB, in order to determine the ideal solution. In 
the interim, we recommend that the $75 filing fee be eliminated 
and that the OSB cover the cost of both counselling sessions. 
The high mean level of fees in BAP cases means that trustees 
can recover significant amounts without voluntary payments. 
4. THE BAP SHOULD PROVIDE THAT THE OSB WILL FILE THE 
BANKRUPTCY AS A LAST RESORT. 
The regulations (and the expanded publicity recommended 
above) should indicate the OSB’s commitment to ensuring that 
the bankruptcy will be filed in a timely fashion even if no 
private trustee is forthcoming, and even if an OSB official must 
administer the bankruptcy.  
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B. WORKING TOWARD UNIFORMITY 
Poor debtors throughout Canada should have access to the 
reformed BAP. However, our interviews suggested that trustees 
are not happy with the existing BAP and, where possible, prefer 
to rely on voluntary agreements among area trustees or on the 
good will of individual trustees. At least until the reformed BAP 
can gain the trust of trustees, we recommend that the voluntary 
agreements among trustees be encouraged and perhaps expanded 
in scope. However, these voluntary systems should be at least as 
cheap as BAP. A first step would be to assess the extent of the 
geographic coverage of the agreements. CAIRP could become 
involved by surveying their members to make an inventory of 
such agreements. Second, the OSB should keep track of files 
where receipts are low to see if they are spread, in a 
representative way, across the country.178  
5. THE OSB SHOULD ESTABLISH, BY DIRECTIVE, A SYSTEM FOR 
REGISTERING CITY SPECIFIC FEE AGREEMENTS REACHED BY TRUSTEES.  
While we believe that the voluntary agreements should be 
encouraged, we also think the OSB should make sure that it is 
aware of all such agreements and that the terms of the 
agreements are consistent with the aim of the reformed BAP—
ease of access and no out-of-pocket costs to the debtor. In the 
end, it is not obvious whether it will be better to have only a 
reformed BAP, only a set of voluntary agreements or a 
combination of the two. Informed decision-making about the 
need for the BAP can only be made if a close watch is kept on 
the operation of the voluntary agreements. 
                                            
178 To aid in this effort, the SRD should be modified so that voluntary 
payments are shown in a uniform way. As explained in Appendix C, the 
current form does not allow all voluntary payments to be identified. 
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C. IMPARTIAL AGENCY 
6. AN IMPARTIAL AGENCY SHOULD BE CREATED TO GIVE POOR 
DEBTORS ADVICE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THEIR DEBT. 
Currently, Canadian debtors have no place to turn for impartial 
debt advice. Debtors can seek advice from credit counselling 
services but these are either financed by creditors or are for-
profit, fee-charging entities; most require 100 percent 
repayment.179 Trustees are another possible source but they have 
a clear incentive to recommend bankruptcy. The creation of a 
neutral agency that provides advice on debtors’ rights vis-à-vis 
their creditors and suggests the most appropriate remedy is 
recommended. We recommend the creation of an impartial debt 
advice agency in 2 to 3 pilot sites in the short term (Toronto, 
Montreal and Vancouver). 
                                            
179 The Office of Consumer Affairs recently published a study of credit 
counseling which highlights the lack of regulation of that industry and its 
potential bias. 
2007] BANKRUPTCY FOR THE POOR? 57 
 
APPENDIX A 
Description of Trustees Interviewed 
Trustee 1  
Trustee 1 works in Montreal in a mid-market, regional 
Chartered Accountant and Consulting firm with offices in 
Toronto and Montreal. She has recently moved offices and the 
exact number of files and division of consumer/commercial files 
is not yet available. The primary target market for the firm is 
privately held companies ranging from $10 million in revenues 
to complex organizations with annual revenues of $150 million.  
Trustee 2  
This trustee works in the Windsor area, administering 
approximately 100 bankruptcy files per year. Ninety-five percent 
of her business encompasses consumer bankruptcies. 
Trustee 3  
Trustee 3 is a sole practitioner in Edmonton, previously having 
worked for large accounting firms and other sole practitioners. 
She has a social work background. Trustee 3's practice is 
composed entirely of consumer bankruptcies, administering 
about 250 files per year. She has twenty years of experience in 
the bankruptcy field. 
Trustee 4  
Trustee 4 is part of a mid-size accounting firm in Toronto where 
he heads the insolvency division. He has been in practice since 
the early 1980s, formerly with large accounting firms. He is a 
specialist in both corporate and personal bankruptcy, providing 
consulting services to both debtors and creditors. 
Trustee 5  
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Trustee 5 is a sole practitioner in London, Ontario. His firm 
primarily administers consumer bankruptcies, with 95 per cent 
of the business focusing on consumer files. 
Trustee 6  
Trustee 6 works in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in an office of four 
trustees; he specializes in the areas of financial restructuring, 
receivership, and bankruptcy. Trustee 6’s firm undertakes both 
corporate and consumer bankruptcies, handling about 500 
consumer bankruptcies each year. 
Trustee 7  
Trustee 7 works for a small firm with offices in Toronto, 
Kingston, and Brockville. The business handles mostly 
consumer files, approximately 400 per year. He has worked as a 
trustee for 10 years. 
Trustee 8  
This trustee has worked six of her 11 years as a trustee in 
private practice. She currently handles bankruptcy files in the 
Greater Toronto Area, administering approximately 400 
bankruptcies each year. 
Trustee 9 
This trustee works at a national firm in Ottawa.  
Bankrupt 
A female poor debtor (under our definition) who has been 
through the bankruptcy system two times. The second time she 
was assigned into bankruptcy it was under the BAP program. 
She was referred to us by her BAP trustee. 
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APPENDIX B 
BIA, Rule 128(1)  
Also, see OSB Circular 2, which was introduced in 1999 and 
imposes the $10,000 maximum. 
TRUSTEE’S FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS IN SUMMARY 
ADMINISTRATION 
128. (1) The fees of the trustee for services performed in a 
summary administration are calculated on the total receipts 
remaining after deducting necessary disbursements relating 
directly to the realization of the property of the bankrupt, and 
the payments to secured creditors, according to the following 
percentages: 
(a) 100 per cent on the first $975 or less of receipts; 
(b) 35 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $975 
but not exceeding $2,000; and 
(c) 50 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $2,000. 
(2) A trustee in a summary administration may claim, in 
addition to the amount set out in subsection (1), 
(a) the costs of counselling referred to in subsection 131(2); 
(b) the fee for filing an assignment referred to in paragraph 
132(a); 
(c) the fee payable to the registrar under paragraph 1(a) of Part 
II of the schedule; 
(d) the amount of applicable federal and provincial taxes for 
goods and services; and 
(e) a lump sum of $100 in respect of administrative 
disbursements. 
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(3) A trustee in a summary administration may withdraw from 
the bank account used in administering the estate of the 
bankrupt, as an advance on the amount set out in subsection (1), 
(a) $250, at the time of the mailing of the notice of 
bankruptcy; 
(b) an additional $250, thirty days after the date of the 
bankruptcy; and 
(c) an additional $250, four months after the date of the 
bankruptcy. 
(4) Subsections (1) to (3) apply to bankruptcies in respect of 
which proceedings are commenced on or after September 30, 
1997 and the accounts are taxed on or after April 30, 1998. 
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APPENDIX C 
The data analysis reported at several points in the text was 
conducted by the Business Intelligence Centre (BIC) of the Office 
of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB). The statistical 
analysis of consumer bankruptcy was greatly eased by the 
advent of electronic filing on January 1, 2002; most documents 
related to consumer bankruptcies are now electronically 
submitted and can be quickly and accurately analyzed. 
Two factors determined our choice of a data file on which to 
base our analysis. First, our analysis was concerned with trustee 
fees and creditor dividends, so we needed a sample of 
bankruptcies that had electronically-submitted Statements of 
Receipts and Disbursements (SRD). The SRD shows all receipts 
and disbursements arising from a consumer bankruptcy, 
including trustee fees, voluntary payments by debtors and 
dividends disbursed to the creditors. The trustee typically 
submits the SRD to the OSB at least nine months after the 
bankruptcy was filed, close to the date when the bankruptcy file 
is closed. Second, most bankruptcies filed by poor debtors will 
be summary administration cases so we wanted to limit the 
analysis to such files.  
These two factors led us to choose to analyze all summary 
administration bankruptcies for which a Statement of Receipts 
and Disbursement was electronically-submitted between 
January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006. According to BIC, there 
were 29,279 such bankruptcies available for analysis. 
Note that these are not all summary administration 
bankruptcies filed in calendar 2006. Because of the lag between 
the filing of a bankruptcy and the submission of an SRD months 
(and possibly years) later, many of the bankruptcies that we 
analyze will have been filed in calendar 2005 (and, for a small 
number, in 2004). Furthermore, we are looking only at SRDs 
submitted electronically. Nonetheless, we do not expect that 
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substantial bias is introduced by our use of electronically-
submitted SRDs. Finally, not all of the bankruptcies in our 
analytic file were closed in calendar 2006. After the trustee 
submits the SRD, the OSB sends the trustee a letter of comment 
approving the closing of the file. For that reason, not all 
bankruptcies for which an SRD was received in calendar 2006 
will have been closed in calendar 2006.  
All of the statistical information in this paper was generated by 
BIC using the 29,279 electronically-filed cases with SRDs. Many 
variables, including the dividend paid to creditors and the level 
of trustee fees, can be accurately derived from the electronically-
filed cases. However, the value of voluntary payments made by 
the debtor to the trustee must be estimated because trustees are 
not required to report such payments in a consistent fashion. 
Most trustees, however, report them by noting their existence in 
the SRD. For example, a particular dollar amount in the receipt 
portion of the SRD might be identified as “voluntary payment” 
or “payment by debtor”. In some cases, however, voluntary 
payments will have been made but there is no way to identify 
them on the SRD. 
